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1263 
THE CASE AGAINST EXTENDING HAZELWOOD 
V. KUHLMEIER’S PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
TO THE REGULATION OF UNIVERSITY 
STUDENT SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Instead of publishing just the usual articles about upcoming football 
games and campus lectures, the editor of a student newspaper at a state 
university decides to publish some hard-hitting stories. He encourages one 
reporter to write a series of articles criticizing some policy decisions by 
university administrators. When the articles are published, one of the 
administrators demands a retraction. When the editor refuses, the 
administrator calls the paper’s printer and tells it not to print any 
additional issues of the paper unless she preapproves their content.1 
Were the university administrator’s actions permissible under the First 
Amendment?2 For many years, the clear answer was no.3 However, the 
Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Hosty v. Carter suggests that the 
answer is not clear at all and that the administrator should have qualified 
immunity from a First Amendment claim.4 The Seventh Circuit held that 
the deferential standard applied to high school student newspapers since 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier5 applies to college student 
newspapers as well.6 Under Hazelwood, school administrators can censor 
school-sponsored student newspapers as long as the restrictions are related 
to “legitimate pedagogical concerns” such as ensuring that students learn 
intended lessons, preventing students from being exposed to inappropriate 
material, or distancing the school from non-neutral political positions.7  
The purposes of this Note are (1) to analyze whether the framework 
established in Hazelwood should be used to analyze student speech in 
 
 
 1. These facts are based on Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 1330 (2006). The facts are presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as they were when 
the Court of Appeals considered them. Id. at 733. 
 2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
 3. See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 4. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738–39. 
 5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 6. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738–39. 
 7. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73. 
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public universities, and (2) to suggest an alternative approach for assessing 
attempts to regulate student speech at the university level that takes into 
account both the university’s educational and social functions. In Part II of 
this Note, I review the history of student free speech rights in public high 
schools and universities. I discuss early Supreme Court cases recognizing 
expansive student speech rights8 and then discuss the development of the 
“public forum doctrine” and the Hazelwood framework as ways to analyze 
restrictions on student speech.9 I also review post-Hazelwood cases 
applying public forum analysis to university speech restrictions.10 In Part 
III, I analyze the implications of the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in 
Hosty v. Carter, in which the court suggested that an extracurricular 
university newspaper might be a nonpublic forum. I argue that the Hosty 
court’s decision to apply Hazelwood’s public forum analysis mechanically 
to university student speech is unwise because it provides no clear 
standards for students or administrators and places too much power in the 
hands of university officials to eliminate the speech rights of students. 
Furthermore, it raises the prospect that viewpoint discrimination might be 
allowed in a forum that has been long protected.11 In Part IV, I discuss and 
evaluate alternative frameworks for analyzing university student speech. I 
propose a method based on a distinction between curricular and 
extracurricular speech that produces predictable results, preserves the right 
of educators to determine what they teach, and satisfies the policy goal of 
promoting First Amendment values on college campuses.12  
II. HISTORY 
A.  Early Student Speech Cases: An Expansive View of Student Free 
Speech Rights 
The expansive view of student free speech rights established in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District13 provides the 
basis for modern analysis of student speech issues.14 In Tinker, a group of 
high school students was disciplined for wearing black armbands to school 
 
 
 8. See infra Part II.A.  
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C.  
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free 
Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 
486–90 (2001). 
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to protest the Vietnam War, and the students sued the school district for 
violating their First Amendment rights.15 The Supreme Court began its 
analysis by stating, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”16 However, the Court recognized the countervailing 
need for schools to control conduct.17 To balance these concerns, the Court 
held that regulation of student speech is permissible only when allowing 
the speech would “materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”18 
Finding that the school had made no such showing,19 the Court held that 
the school had violated the students’ constitutional rights.20  
Subsequent cases applied the Tinker ruling to state colleges and 
universities. In Healy v. James, a state college denied recognition to a 
proposed chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) on the 
grounds that “the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the 
school’s policies.”21 Using the Tinker standard, the Court found that the 
denial of recognition was constitutionally impermissible.22 The Court 
stated:  
 
 
 15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 16. Id. at 506. The Court noted: 
[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that 
are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons 
to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. 
Id. at 511. The Court also noted that “school officials cannot suppress ‘expressions of feelings with 
which they do not wish to contend.’” Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)).  
 17. Id. at 507. 
 18. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). 
 19. Id. The Court noted that school authorities had no reason to believe that allowing “the 
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.” Id. Instead, the Court found that the decision to ban the armbands was “based upon an 
urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression.” Id. at 510. 
 20. Id. at 514. 
 21. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 175 (1972). Other SDS chapters had been involved in civil 
disobedience on campuses. Id. at 171. The president of the college was concerned that “[t]he published 
aims and philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disruption and violence, 
are contrary to the approved policy” of the college. Id. at 174 n.4. Although the students claimed that 
their chapter would be independent of the national organization, the president was not persuaded. Id. at 
174–75 n.4. The president also “concluded that approval should not be granted to any group that 
‘openly repudiates’ the College’s dedication to academic freedom.” Id. at 175–76. Without 
recognition, the group was denied access to facilities such as campus newspapers and bulletin boards. 
Id. at 176. 
 22. Id. at 189–91. 
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[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, 
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment 
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than 
in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.”23  
Subsequently, in Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of 
Missouri, the Court held that this broad protection applies even to indecent 
or offensive speech.24 
B.  A Shift in the Treatment of Student Speech: Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier and the Public Forum Doctrine 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court 
significantly changed the manner in which it analyzed student speech in 
two ways.25 First, the Court used the public forum analysis it had recently 
developed in non-school First Amendment cases26 as a framework for 
deciding what level of protection to apply to student speech.27 Second, at 
least in the case of school-sponsored speech at the high school level, the 
Court held that a higher degree of deference to school administrators’ 
decisions was appropriate, possibly even in cases involving viewpoint 
discrimination.28  
 
 
 23. Id. at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). The Court also noted that 
“state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.” Id. 
It said that, as in public space generally, “the time, the place, and the manner” of speech could be 
regulated, but not the content.” Id. at 192–93. 
 24. In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, the Supreme Court gave First 
Amendment protection to a newspaper containing violent and sexual political cartoons, demonstrating 
that even indecent or offensive speech enjoys broad protection on college campuses. 410 U.S. 667, 670 
(1973). In Papish, the University of Missouri expelled a student for circulating a newspaper that 
included a political cartoon “depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of 
Justice” and containing an article entitled “M-----f----- Acquitted.” Id. at 667. Applying Healy, the 
Court held that the University had violated the student’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 670. It noted 
that “mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Id. 
 Lower courts have also recognized broad First Amendment protections for university student 
publications. See Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 284 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a state college 
could not reduce funds to a university newspaper in response to an issue it found offensive); Schiff v. 
Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that “the right of free speech embodied in the 
publication of a college student newspaper cannot be controlled except under special circumstances”). 
 25. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 26. See infra notes 29–41 and accompanying text. 
 27. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
 28. Id. at 270–72. For a discussion of whether the Hazelwood framework allows schools to 
regulate speech on the basis of viewpoint, see infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/22
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1. Public Forum Doctrine 
Because public forum analysis was central to the Hazelwood decision, 
an understanding of Hazelwood must begin with an examination of the 
public forum doctrine. The public forum doctrine, first developed in the 
1930s, represents an attempt to balance citizens’ right to speak on 
government property against the government’s need to exert control over 
its property in order to function effectively.29 The most-cited formulation 
of the doctrine was given in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Association.30 Under the Perry formulation, speech that occurs 
on public property can be divided into three categories.31 In the first 
category are traditional public forums, which include parks, streets, and 
sidewalks.32 In traditional public forums, the government can place 
restrictions on the “time, place, and manner of expression” as long as 
those restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels 
of communication.”33 The second category is the limited public forum, 
which is “public property which the State has opened for use by the public 
as a place for expressive activity.”34 Once the government has created a 
 
 
 29. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: 
Lessons from Lamb’s Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1994). Salomone notes that the idea of the 
public forum began in the 1930s and was developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 11–12. She 
describes the doctrine as “a categorical or formulaic approach that the Court uses to reconcile 
constitutional rights and government interests.” Id. at 14; see also Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering 
the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1991). Professor Saphire notes that the public 
forum doctrine provides a predictable alternative to “[u]nstructured interest balancing.” Id. at 754–56.  
 30. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, a public school provided teachers with mailboxes within the 
school buildings. Id. at 39. The mailboxes’ purpose was “to transmit official messages among the 
teachers and between the teachers and the school administration.” Id. Teachers also used the mailboxes 
for personal messages, and some principals allowed them to be used for messages from private 
organizations. Id. The official union had access, but unofficial unions did not. Id. at 40. An unofficial 
union argued that the policy violated its rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 41. The Court found that the rival union’s rights had not 
been violated because the school had not “by policy or by practice . . . opened its mail system for 
indiscriminate use by the general public,” thus creating no limited public forum. Id. at 47. It found that 
since the restriction was viewpoint-neutral, id. at 49, and “consistent with the District’s legitimate 
interest in ‘preserv[ing] the property . . . for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,’” the restriction 
was constitutional. Id. at 50–51 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 130 (1981)). 
 31. Id. at 45–47. 
 32. Id. at 45. The Court noted that these areas “have immemorially been held in trust for the use 
of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
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limited public forum, it is bound by the same restrictions as “in a 
traditional public forum.”35 The third category is the nonpublic forum, 
which is “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication.”36 In such forums, the state may impose 
restrictions that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.37  
Later cases clarified two questions regarding when courts will 
determine that a limited public forum has been created. First, the fact that 
a forum is opened only to a particular group, such as students, does not 
defeat a finding that it is a limited public forum.38 Second, in Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court 
stated that the government’s intent is the key determinant of whether a 
limited public forum has been created.39  
The public forum doctrine has been widely criticized. Commentators 
have noted that its category-based approach is overly formalistic and leads 
to unfair results.40 The doctrine has also been criticized for placing too 
much control in the hands of government officials.41 
 
 
 35. Id. at 46.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. The Court stated that in a nonpublic forum, “the State may reserve the forum for its 
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and 
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The 
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may 
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
 39. 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse.”)  
 40. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum 
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1984) 
(arguing that public forum analysis relies too much on categories and “distracts attention from the first 
amendment values at stake in a given case”); Peltz, supra note 14, at 552 (considering the problem of a 
university reserving the right to censor a newspaper and suggesting that “the limited public 
forum/nonpublic forum dichotomy does not offer the best analytical framework for college media and 
certainly does not offer a framework conducive to post-secondary educational objectives”); Salomone, 
supra note 29, at 11–13 (“Initially, the concept of the public forum was intended to be speech 
protective,” but has evolved into “a rigidly applied set of categorical rules which cover not only access 
by the general public to government property, but also the use of government property for expressive 
purposes by those who already enjoy rightful access such as students.”). 
 Others have praised the public forum analysis for its “potential to lend stability and structure to 
first amendment decisionmaking.” Saphire, supra note 29, at 757. Saphire argues that public forum 
analysis often provides “certainty and predictability,” whereas “[u]nstructured interest balancing” 
would cause administrative problems. Id. at 755. 
 41. See, e.g., Salomone, supra note 29, at 15. Salomone notes that the limited public forum 
category “ha[s] the dangerous potential of placing almost unbridled discretion in the hands of 
government officials when defining the limits of those rights.” Id. She asks, “If the freedoms contained 
in the Bill of Rights are intended to serve as constraints on governmental abuse of authority, how can 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/22
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2.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier and the Introduction of the 
“Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns” Test 
Hazelwood involved a school-sponsored high school newspaper 
published as part of a journalism class.42 One issue of the paper included 
articles about divorce and pregnancy.43 The principal, concerned about 
sexual references in the articles, removed the articles prior to 
publication.44 The student journalists sued, claiming that their First 
Amendment rights had been violated.45  
The Court found that the paper was a nonpublic forum because the 
school had not demonstrated a “clear intent to create a public forum,” as 
required by Cornelius.46 It emphasized the curricular nature of the 
newspaper and the degree of control exercised by the school over the 
newspaper.47 It did not find dispositive policy statements suggesting that 
the newspaper would be free from restrictions on free expression. 48 
Having found a nonpublic forum, the Court announced a new test for how 
the forum could be regulated: educators can exercise “control over the 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”49  
 
 
the Court justify a doctrine that permits government to decide whether it chooses to be subject to such 
constraint?” Id.  
 42. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988). The newspaper, the 
Spectrum, was partially funded with school funds. Id. at 262. 
 43. Id. at 263. The articles contained discussions of students’ personal experiences with 
pregnancy and included references to birth control and sexual activity. Id. 
 44. Id. at 264. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)). In so finding, it disagreed with the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit, which found that the 
school had established a limited public forum. Id. at 265–66. 
 47. Id. at 268. The Court noted that the newspaper was part of the curriculum, was taught during 
normal school hours, involved grades and academic credit, and that the school established learning 
goals for the students working on the paper. Id. It also looked to the practice of school officials in 
exercising “a great deal of control” over the newspaper, including final editing. Id. (alteration in 
original). 
 48. Id. at 269. The school board had a policy statement that “[s]chool sponsored student 
publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible 
journalism,” and the Spectrum’s published policy “declared that ‘Spectrum, as a student-press 
publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment.’” Id.  
 49. Id. at 273. The Court stated:  
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [school-sponsored speech] to assure 
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or 
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and 
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Court mentioned four factors relevant to determining whether an 
educator’s actions are reasonable: (1) the school’s sponsorship of the 
newspaper, (2) the curricular nature of the newspaper, (3) the age of the 
student audience, and (4) the likelihood that the speech would be 
associated with the school.50 Applying this test, the Court found that the 
principal had acted reasonably.51 It emphasized that the paper was part of 
the curriculum because it was developed as part of a class and the school 
sponsored it.52 It held that the principal’s actions were motivated by a 
reasonable belief that the journalism students had not learned the lessons 
intended to be taught53 and that it was inappropriate to expose younger 
students to sexual material.54  
The new standard for evaluating student speech announced in 
Hazelwood has been widely criticized.55 The Court gave little justification 
for its decision to create a new standard for student speech,56 and it altered 
 
 
Id. at 271. The Court mentioned that examples of student speech which could be censored include 
“speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or 
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences,” id., or speech that might 
“associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy,” id. at 
272. 
 50. Id. at 271–72.  
 51. Id. at 272–73. 
 52. Id. at 271–72. The Court did not limit its holding to classroom exercises; it characterized as 
part of the curriculum any activities that are “supervised by faculty members and designed to impart 
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,” such as “publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Id. at 271. 
 53. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276, noting: 
Reynolds could reasonably have concluded that the students who had written and edited these 
articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the Journalism II curriculum that 
pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the 
privacy of individuals whose most intimate concerns are to be revealed in the newspaper, and 
“the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists within [a] school 
community” that includes adolescent subjects and readers. 
 54. Id. at 274–75 (“It was not unreasonable for the principal to have concluded that such frank 
talk was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen and 
presumably taken home to be read by students’ even younger brothers and sisters.”). 
 55. See infra notes 56–59. 
 56. In a dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Court’s distinction between school-sponsored 
and non-school-sponsored speech had no basis in the Court’s precedents. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277–
91 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also stated: 
The Court offers no more than an obscure tangle of three excuses to afford educators “greater 
control” over school-sponsored speech than the Tinker test would permit: the public 
educator’s prerogative to control curriculum; the pedagogical interest in shielding the high 
school audience from objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics; and the school’s need to 
dissociate itself from student expression. . . . Tinker fully addresses the first concern; the 
second is illegitimate; and the third is readily achievable through less oppressive means.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/22
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the public forum analysis in a way that makes it difficult for a court to find 
anything related to a school to be a public forum.57 Furthermore, the 
deferential nature and malleability of the test seems to allow little or no 
review of schools’ decisions.58 Moreover, the Hazelwood Court did not 
address the question of whether its decision abolished the requirement that 
restrictions in nonpublic forums be viewpoint neutral.59 Hazelwood has 
had a profoundly chilling effect on high school journalism.60 
 
 
Id. at 282–83. See also Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School 
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 433, 448–49 (2000) (noting that the Court failed to justify its creation of a 
new standard). 
 57. David L. Dagley, Trends in Judicial Analysis Since Hazelwood: Expressive Rights in the 
Public Schools, 123 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 1, 35 (Mar. 19, 1998). Dagley argues that the Hazelwood 
test short-circuits the public forum inquiry, since courts tend to assume that any speech that might be 
considered part of the curriculum is a nonpublic forum and that nearly any control of curriculum by 
school officials will be considered sufficiently reasonable to be upheld. Id.  
 58. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect: A 
Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 137 (1995) (“[The Hazelwood test] 
translates into essentially no judicial review of the school authorities’ conduct.”); see also Felder, 
supra note 56, at 446–48 (discussing the vague and overbroad nature of the legitimate pedagogical 
concerns test). 
 59. The Hazelwood Court’s list of permissible reasons to censor suggests that some viewpoint 
discrimination may be permissible, since it includes “student speech that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 
‘the shared values of a civilized social order’ or to associate the school with any position other than 
neutrality on matters of political controversy.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 272 (citation omitted) (quoting 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). Some criticized the Hazelwood Court 
for failing to address the viewpoint neutrality issue directly. See, e.g., William G. Buss, School 
Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 513 (1989) (noting that 
the Court was “seemingly oblivious to the implications of viewpoint discrimination”). Some predicted 
that viewpoint discrimination would still be prohibited since the Court had not explicitly abolished the 
requirement. See, e.g., Martha M. McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat To Free 
Inquiry in Public Schools, 81 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 685, 689 (June 3, 1993). Subsequent 
commentators have noted that a split in the circuits has developed: the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits retain the viewpoint neutrality requirement, but the First and Third Circuits allow viewpoint 
discrimination in nonpublic forums under a Hazelwood analysis. See Janna J. Annest, Note, Only the 
News That’s Fit to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality 
Requirement in Public School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1242–47 (2002); see also 
Denise Daugherty, Note, Free Speech in Public Schools: Has the Supreme Court Created a Haven for 
Viewpoint Discrimination in School-Sponsored Speech?, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1069–78 (2004).  
 60. Brief of Amici Curiae Student Press Law Center et al. in Support of Petition of Margaret L. 
Hosty, Jeni S. Potche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Hosty v. Carter, 126 S. Ct. 1330 
(2006) (No. 05–377), 2005 WL 2736314, at *2 [hereinafter SPLC amicus brief]. According to the 
Student Press Law Center (SPLC), a group providing information and support to student publications, 
there “has been a sharp rise in high school censorship incidents reported.” Id. at *14. The SPLC argues 
that Hazelwood “has given high school and elementary school officials far greater authority to censor 
the otherwise lawful speech of private citizens than is extended to any other group of government 
officials, except perhaps prison wardens.” Id. at *11. It describes numerous cases in which courts have 
used Hazelwood to uphold censorship. Id. at *11–12; see also Peltz, supra note 14, at 497 (citing lower 
court cases upholding censorship under Hazelwood). Peltz also discusses several censored stories that 
never reached trial, including a story reporting that the school superintendent had been arrested for 
drunk driving censored because the school did not want a newspaper that would be “critical of students 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1263 Golby book pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1272 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1263 
 
 
 
 
C.  University Student Speech Rights Since Hazelwood  
Hazelwood expressly left open the question of whether the level of 
deference the Court accorded high school administrators should be 
extended to the university context.61 However, since Hazelwood, courts 
have consistently applied public forum analysis to cases involving both 
curricular and extracurricular speech at public universities.62 At the 
university level, whether speech restrictions are upheld tends to turn on 
whether the speech occurs as part of the curriculum.63 
Generally, courts applying the Hazelwood analysis to restrictions on 
curricular speech at universities have upheld the restrictions.64 In Brown v. 
Li, the Ninth Circuit held that a university could restrict a graduate 
student’s negative statements in the “Acknowledgments” section of his 
master’s thesis.65 Although no two members of the panel agreed on a 
rationale for the decision, one member used Hazelwood to analyze the 
student’s speech66 and found that the thesis was a nonpublic forum 
because it was curricular in nature.67 She also agreed with the university’s 
 
 
or staff” and a story about teachers who smoked on campus in violation of a school policy censored 
because it would have been embarrassing. Id. at 497–99 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Student Press 
Law Center et al. in Support of the Appeal of Charles Kincaid and Capri Coffer, Kincaid v. Gibson, 
191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-5385)).  
 61. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of 
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and 
university level.”). 
 62. See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
 63. See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
 65. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). Brown, a chemistry graduate student, replaced the 
“Acknowledgments” section of his master’s thesis with a section entitled “Disacknowledgments,” in 
which he offered “special Fuck You’s” to individuals and entities he felt had hindered his graduate 
career. Id. at 943. The University refused to file his thesis with that section, arguing that “the entire 
paper . . . was subject to the review and approval of the thesis committee.” Id. at 944. It found that his 
“Disacknowledgments” section “did not meet professional standards.” Id. at 943. Brown was placed 
on academic probation and his thesis was not filed. Id. at 944–45. He sued, claiming, among other 
things, a violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 945–46.   
 66. Id. at 949. Two of the three judges on the panel denied the student’s First Amendment claim, 
but they did so for different reasons. Judge Graber based her conclusion on a Hazelwood analysis, id., 
while Judge Ferguson concluded that the student had been cheating and thus was not protected by the 
First Amendment, id. at 955–56 (Ferguson, J., concurring) (affirming the District Court decision and 
the remand on state issues). The third member, Judge Reinhardt, found that the student’s First 
Amendment rights had been violated and that Hazelwood deference should not apply to college 
students. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 67. Id. at 950. Judge Graber stated, “An academic thesis co-signed by a committee of professors 
is not a public forum, limited or otherwise.” Id. at 954. She also stated, “The Supreme Court has 
suggested that core curricular speech—that which is an integral part of the classroom-teaching 
function of an educational institution—differs from students’ extracurricular speech and that a public 
educational institution retains discretion to prescribe its curriculum.” Id. at 950. She cited a Supreme 
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argument that encouraging the student to “conform to professional norms” 
was a legitimate pedagogical purpose that could trump the student’s free 
speech rights.68  
Similarly, in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit applied 
Hazelwood to uphold a university’s decision to require a student in an 
acting class to recite lines containing profanity over her protest that saying 
such words violated her religious beliefs.69 Based on its curricular nature, 
the court found the speech to be in a nonpublic forum.70 Applying 
Hazelwood, the court held that the university’s actions were permissible as 
long as they were related to the university’s asserted legitimate 
pedagogical purpose of preparing students for acting careers.71  
Conversely, courts have upheld student speech rights in extracurricular 
settings, which they consider to be limited public forums rather than 
 
 
Court opinion holding that a school board could not remove books containing ideas the school board 
disliked from a school library but limiting its holding to speech that was not curricular. Id. (citing Bd. 
of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)). She also noted that 
other courts had held that “extracurricular activities, such as yearbooks and newspapers” were not 
subject to the same level of deference as curricular activities. Id. at 949.  
 68. Id. at 953–54. Judge Graber also found that even viewpoint discrimination was allowed if 
there was a legitimate pedagogical purpose for it. She noted, “Hazelwood and Settle establish that—
consistent with the First Amendment—a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a 
particular viewpoint . . . so long as the requirement serves a legitimate pedagogical purpose.” Id. at 
953. The second case to which Judge Graber referred, Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 
(6th Cir. 1995), held that a high school teacher did not violate a student’s right to free speech by 
limiting the topics available to a student for a research paper. 
 In a sharp dissent, Judge Reinhardt argued that “the reasons underlying the deference with respect 
to the regulation of the speech rights of high school youths do not apply in the adult world of college 
and graduate students.” Id. at 957. He suggested alternative solutions, such as finding that the thesis 
was a limited public forum, or adopting an intermediate level of scrutiny in which “the university 
would have the burden of demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate student speech was 
substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.” Id. at 964. 
 69. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). In Axson-Flynn, a Mormon student in an acting class refused 
to take God’s name in vain or to say the word “fuck.” Id. at 1281. After several incidents involving 
refusal to say those words, her instructors told her that she could remain in the program only if she 
changed her values. Id. at 1282. Though she was never actually asked to leave, she left because she 
believed it was inevitable. Id. She sued, arguing that the university’s attempt to compel her to speak 
violated her First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 1283. Axson-Flynn also claimed that the 
University had violated her rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 1283. 
 70. Id. at 1286–87. The court emphasized that learning was the focus of the exercise. It 
acknowledged “that some circuits have cast doubt on the application of Hazelwood in the context of 
university extracurricular activities.” Id. at 1286 n.6. 
 71. Id. at 1291–92. The University asserted that compelling acting students to say lines that 
might offend them served a legitimate pedagogical purpose because “(1) it teaches students how to 
step out outside their own values . . . ; (2) it teaches students to preserve the integrity of the author’s 
work; and (3) it measures true acting skills to be able convincingly to portray an offensive part.” Id. at 
1291 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that the University’s actions would not have been 
permissible had the asserted pedagogical concerns been merely a pretext for religious discrimination. 
Id. at 1292–95. 
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nonpublic forums. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of 
Virginia, the Supreme Court used public forum analysis to hold that a 
university’s student activity funding program could not specifically 
exclude religious activities.72 Because the funding program was 
extracurricular in nature, it was a limited public forum.73 By banning 
religious activities from that forum, the university had engaged in 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.74 The Court emphasized the 
importance of free speech rights at universities, noting the danger of 
“chilling of individual thought and expression” in a setting “where the 
State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment 
that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”75  
In Kincaid v. Gibson, the Sixth Circuit relied on public forum analysis 
to find that a university could not withhold publication of a student 
yearbook produced as part of an extracurricular activity.76 In Kincaid, a 
 
 
 72. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The University of Virginia had established a system for funding the 
activities of student organizations. Id. at 824–25. The purpose of the funding program was “to support 
a broad range of extracurricular student activities that ‘are related to the educational purpose of the 
University.’” Id. at 824 (citation omitted). However, certain activities, such as religious activities 
(defined as “any activity that primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or 
an ultimate reality”), electioneering and lobbying, and social entertainment were excluded from 
funding. Id. at 825 (citation omitted). Rosenberger had formed a student group, Wide Awake 
Productions (WAP), whose mission was to “facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of 
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints.” Id. at 825–26 (citation omitted). WAP was 
recognized as a student group and therefore was not considered a religious organization. Id. at 826. 
When WAP requested funding from the University to pay for the costs of printing its paper, the 
University found that the paper was a “religious activity” and thus excluded from the funding regime. 
Id. at 827 (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. at 829. The Court noted that the funding program “is a forum more in a metaphysical than 
in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.” Id. at 830. 
 74. Id. at 829–30. The Court noted, “The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and 
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or 
for the discussion of certain topics.” Id. at 829. However, “[o]nce it has opened a limited forum . . . the 
State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.” Id. The Court distinguished between 
“content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, 
and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed 
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.” Id. at 830. 
 The Court acknowledged it had previously held that when the government is acting as the speaker, 
it has broad rights to fund that speech selectively. Id. at 833. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court held that it 
was permissible for the government to prohibit its grant funds from being used to fund abortion 
counseling because “[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a 
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” 500 U.S. 173, 
193 (1991). The Court distinguished Rust in Rosenberger because in Rosenberger the government was 
not itself acting as the speaker. 515 U.S. at 834. The Court said, “A holding that the University may 
not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict 
the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.” Id. 
 75. Id. at 835.  
 76. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).  
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school official refused to distribute yearbooks she deemed “of poor 
quality.”77 The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the administrator 
had violated the student editors’ First Amendment rights.78 The court 
examined four factors to determine whether the government had intended 
to open a limited public forum: (1) the school’s policy, (2) the school’s 
practice, (3) the compatibility of the yearbook with expressive activity, 
and (4) the context in which the yearbook was found.79 The court found 
that the university’s policy statements putting control in student hands,80 
the practical control of the yearbook by the students, the compatibility of a 
yearbook with free expression,81 and the university context weighed in 
favor of finding that the yearbook was a limited public forum that allowed 
for greater student expression.82  
Commentators and student journalists generally celebrated the ultimate 
resolution of Kincaid.83 However, the decision left open several 
concerning questions: (1) Could a court ever determine that an 
extracurricular, expressive student activity, such as a newspaper, is a 
nonpublic forum?84 (2) If a nonpublic forum were found, would a court 
apply Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test in such a 
setting?85 (3) If so, would the court find viewpoint discrimination 
permissible?86 A recent Seventh Circuit decision, Hosty v. Carter, 
suggests that the answer to each of these questions could be yes.  
 
 
 77. Id. at 345. The Vice President for Student Affairs objected to the fact that the yearbook’s 
cover was not in the school colors, that its theme (“destination unknown”) was inappropriate, that its 
photographs were inadequately captioned, and that it included descriptions of current events unrelated 
to the activities of the school. Id. The district court, relying on Hazelwood, found that the yearbook 
was a nonpublic forum and upheld the administrator’s decision. Id. at 346 (describing the district court 
opinion). The district court held that “the yearbook was not intended to be a journal of expression and 
communication in a public forum sense, but instead was intended to be a journal of the ‘goings on’ in 
[a] particular year at [the school].” Id. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Id. 
 78. Id. at 357. 
 79. Id. at 349.  
 80. Id. at 349–50. The policy stated, “In order to meet the responsible standards of journalism, an 
advisor may require changes in the form of materials submitted by students, but such changes must 
deal only with the form or the time and manner of expressions rather than alteration of content.” Id. at 
350 (citation and emphasis omitted). The court noted that this language “tracks the Supreme Court’s 
description of the limitations on government regulation of expressive activity in a limited public 
forum.” Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).  
 81. Id. at 351. 
 82. Id. at 352. The court also noted that, since the yearbook was a limited public forum, 
“Hazelwood has little application to this case.” Id. at 346 n.5. 
 83. See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 14, at 536. 
 84. Id. at 537. 
 85. See supra note 61. 
 86. See supra note 59. 
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D.  Hosty v. Carter  
Hosty v. Carter involved the Innovator, an extracurricular student 
newspaper funded by student activity fees at Governors State University in 
Illinois.87 The Innovator ran some articles that attacked the integrity of the 
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.88 The administration accused 
the students of “irresponsible and defamatory journalism” and asked the 
students to retract several factual statements or print the administration’s 
responses.89 When the student editors refused, Patricia Carter, Dean of 
Student Affairs and Services, stopped printing of the paper.90 The students 
sued Dean Carter, alleging that she had violated their First Amendment 
rights.91 Dean Carter claimed that she was entitled to qualified immunity 
because she had not violated a clearly established right of the students.92 
Both the district court and a panel of the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
the Dean’s act of censorship violated the clearly established rights of the 
students.93 The Seventh Circuit then elected to re-hear the case en banc. 
 
 
 87. 412 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006). All facts are 
presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as they were when the Court of Appeals 
considered them. Id. at 733. 
 88. Id. at 732–33.  
 89. Id. at 733. 
 90. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Dean Carter told the paper’s printer not to print any future 
issues without her approval, and the printer followed her orders. Id.  
 91. Id. at 733. The students also sued the University trustees, other administrators, and several 
staff members, all of whom prevailed on a summary judgment motion except Dean Carter. Id.  
 92. Id. The qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials from personal liability for 
unlawful conduct in cases where the official makes a reasonable mistake as to the law. Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). To determine whether an official has qualified immunity from a 
constitutional claim, the court engages in a two-step inquiry. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733. First, the court 
asks whether “the facts alleged show the [public official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. 
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Second, the court asks whether that right was “clearly established.” 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.  
 93. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733. The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that Hazelwood 
applied to this case, noting that Hazelwood involved a supervised class activity, while the Innovator 
was an “autonomous student organization,” and that Hazelwood involved a high school rather than a 
university. Hosty v. Governors State Univ., No. 01 C 500, 2001 WL 1465621 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 
2001). The panel of the Court of Appeals did not engage in any forum analysis, though it did note that 
the policy of the newspaper was that the student staff “will determine content and format of their 
respective publications without censorship or advance approval.” Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 946 
(7th Cir. 2003). Instead of using forum analysis, the panel opinion focused on “whether the principles 
of Hazelwood apply to public college and university students.” Id. The court noted, “For several 
decades, courts have consistently held that student media at public colleges and universities are 
entitled to strong First Amendment protections.” Id. at 947. It cited pre-Hazelwood decisions as well as 
post-Hazelwood decisions in which university student speech in limited public forums was found to be 
protected. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) and 
Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). The panel stated, “Hazelwood’s rationale 
for limiting the First Amendment rights of high school journalism students is not a good fit for 
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Writing “Hazelwood provides our starting point,”94 the majority reversed 
the panel’s decision.95  
The court began by addressing the type of forum at issue.96 It stated 
that the relevant question was whether the university’s policies and 
practices indicated that it had “declare[d] the pages of the student 
newspaper open for expression,” thereby creating a limited public forum.97 
The court rejected both the plaintiffs’ argument that age of the students 
should control the public forum question98 and the bright-line distinction 
between curricular and extracurricular speech that appeared to have 
developed in some earlier cases.99 The court found that, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Innovator might be a public forum, but 
that additional facts might show otherwise.100 Next, the court held that 
Hazelwood’s legitimate pedagogical concerns test should be applied at the 
college level; the more advanced age of the students did not warrant 
abandonment of the test.101 Rather, the court held, age should be a factor 
in assessing the reasonableness of some asserted pedagogical concerns.102 
 
 
students at colleges or universities,” emphasizing the difference in age and the long tradition of 
protecting university speech. Id. at 948.  
 94. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 95. Id. at 739. 
 96. Id. at 735–36. The court asked: “[W]as the reporter a speaker in a public forum (no 
censorship allowed?) or did the University either create a non-public forum or publish the paper itself 
(a closed forum where content may be supervised)?” Id. 
 97. Id. at 737. Unlike the court in Kincaid, the Hosty court did not explicitly list a series of 
factors to be considered. See id. at 737–38. 
 98. Id. at 734–35. In rejecting age as a controlling factor, the court pointed out that public forums 
had been found in elementary schools. Id. at 735. It noted, “If private speech at a public forum is off-
limits to regulation even when that forum is a classroom of an elementary school . . . then speech in a 
non-public forum, and underwritten at public expense, may be open to reasonable regulation even at 
the college level—or later.” Id.  
 99. Id. at 736. “[I]f the Constitution establishes a bright line between curricular activities and all 
other speech, then decisions such as Rust and Finley are inexplicable, for they hold that speakers who 
have completed their education still must abide by the conditions attached to public subsidies of 
speech and other expressive activities.” Id. The court also noted that “being part of the curriculum may 
be a sufficient condition of a non-public forum,” but that “it is not a necessary condition.” Id.  
 100. Id. at 736–38. In finding that the Innovator might be a public forum, the court pointed out 
that the Innovator board’s policy was that the publication “will determine content and format . . . 
without censorship or advance approval.” Id. at 737. The court stated, “If this is all there is to it, then 
. . . a designated public forum has been established, and the faculty cannot censor speech within it.” Id. 
However, the court noted that the finding might be different if a trial were to reveal that the school had 
“established criteria for subsidized student publications” or if the faculty advisor exercised some 
control over the newspaper. Id. at 737–38. 
 101. Id. at 734–35.  
 102. Id. The court noted that when a school’s justification for censorship is a pedagogical concern 
based on the maturity of its students, “the difference between high school and university students may 
be important.” Id. at 734. On the other hand, when a school’s justification is based on “the desire to 
ensure ‘high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under [the school’s] auspices’” or a 
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Finally, the court concluded that, given the uncertainty of the state of the 
law, Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity.103  
Judge Evans, writing for the four dissenting judges, rejected the idea 
that Hazelwood should apply in this case, noting the differences between 
colleges and high schools104 and the differences between extracurricular 
and curricular activities.105 He concluded that “a reasonable person in 
Dean Carter’s shoes would have believed the Innovator operated as a 
public forum” and thus should not be entitled to qualified immunity.106 
The students petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, but the petition was denied.107  
III. ANALYSIS 
By extending Hazelwood’s framework to extracurricular activities, the 
Hosty court granted more power to public university officials to censor 
student speech than any court of appeals had done previously. Prior to 
Hosty, college students enjoyed broad free speech rights, at least with 
regard to their extracurricular activities,108 which has allowed a thriving 
college journalism community to develop.109 Hosty suggests that college 
 
 
desire to “dissociat[e] the school from ‘any position other than neutrality on matters of political 
controversy,’ there is no sharp difference between high school and college papers.” Id. at 734–35 
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988)). Even when age is a 
factor, however, the court noted that there was no bright-line age difference between high school and 
college students, since “many high school seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior 
colleges are similar to many high schools.” Id. at 734.  
 103. Id. at 738–39. The court held that even if the district court had been correct in holding that 
Hazelwood does not apply to college newspapers, “it greatly overstates the certainty of the law to say 
that any reasonable college administrator had to know that rule.” Id. at 738. “Public officials need not 
predict, at their financial peril, how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved.” Id. at 739. The court 
emphasized that “[m]any aspects of the law with respect to students’ speech, not only the role of age, 
are difficult to understand and apply.” Id. It also noted that the question of the level of deference 
applicable to college newspapers had been reserved by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood, 
demonstrating that it was not “clearly established,” and mentioned that the approaches of the other 
circuits varied. Id. at 738. Finally, the court pointed out that the dean was not necessarily bound to 
know that the Innovator operated in a public forum. Id.  
 104. Id. at 740–42 (Evans, J., dissenting). Judge Evans emphasized the different missions of high 
schools and colleges. Id. at 741–42. He noted that “[e]lementary and secondary schools have ‘custodial 
and tutelary responsibility for children.’” Id. at 741 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002)). In contrast, “[a] university has a different purpose—to expose 
students to a ‘marketplace of ideas.’” Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 105. Id. at 743–44. Judge Evans called the classroom and the extracurricular activity “very 
different situations.” Id. at 743. 
 106. Id. at 744. 
 107. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006). 
 108. See supra Part II.A. 
 109. See SPLC amicus brief, supra note 60, at *5–*6. 
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journalists can no longer assume that they will be free from censorship. If 
followed by other courts, the Hosty approach will produce troubling 
results for several reasons.  
First, the public forum doctrine, relied on in Hosty, places a great deal 
of control in the hands of public school administrators.110 In Cornelius, the 
Court stated, “We will not find that a public forum has been created in the 
face of clear evidence of a contrary intent.”111 As Professor Peltz asks, 
“what happens when a college explicitly states its desire to control student 
media as nonpublic forums?”112 Ostensibly, the Hosty and Kincaid 
decisions suggest that factors other than the university’s policy should be 
considered: actual practice, context, and the nature of the forum.113 
However, given that all of these factors are merely ways of discerning the 
government’s intent to open a forum,114 it seems likely that a court would 
consider a clear statement of intent dispositive.115 In such a situation, a 
university would seem to have the ability to eliminate free speech rights 
merely by saying that it wishes to do so. Moreover, this creates the danger 
that a university could “create the appearance of a public forum in all 
practical respects but reserve to itself, via written policy alone, the 
discretion to shatter that appearance and intervene as censor whenever 
convenience dictates.”116  
Second, current public forum doctrine fails to provide clear criteria for 
students or administrators to determine what is a nonpublic forum and 
what is a limited public forum, and thus what level of regulation is 
acceptable.117 Even the Hosty majority recognized this when it held that, 
although the facts in the record suggested that the Innovator was a public 
forum, it was reasonable for Dean Carter to believe she could censor it as 
if it were a nonpublic forum.118 Other cases demonstrate the difficulty in 
determining forum status in the university context as well; in Kincaid, for 
example, the district court found that the yearbook was a nonpublic forum, 
 
 
 110. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Peltz, supra note 14, at 533–34.  
 111. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985). 
 112. Peltz, supra note 14, at 537 (italicized in original).  
 113. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.  
 114. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.  
 115. See Peltz, supra note 14, at 550–51. Paradoxically, the “practice” factor may actually 
encourage the school to interfere with the production of a publication to help it establish a practice of 
censorship. Id. at 551–52. 
 116. Id. at 551; see also Buss, supra note 59, at 526 (“If the school creates what appears to be an 
open forum for student expression but in fact has not done so, the audience might erroneously 
conclude that all ideas have been heard.”). 
 117. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987–88 (2d ed. 1988).  
 118. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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a divided panel of the Court of Appeals found that it was a nonpublic 
forum, and a divided en banc Court of Appeals found that it was a limited 
public forum.119 When courts are so divided, students and administrators 
will have great difficulty determining what their rights are.120  
Third, in applying a standard developed for high schools to colleges, 
the Hosty decision ignores the significant differences between college and 
high school students. Unlike secondary schools, universities are almost 
entirely composed of adults.121 The law treats children and adults 
differently in a variety of areas,122 and the Hosty decision ignores the more 
liberal free speech rights of adults by equating college students with 
schoolchildren. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he state’s 
authority over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of 
adults.”123 To justify different standards based on age, the Supreme Court 
has noted that “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize 
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”124 In addition, courts 
have noted that the missions of high schools and colleges are different.125 
High schools “have ‘custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.’”126 
Colleges, on the other hand, are supposed to serve as a “marketplace of 
ideas” in order to train future leaders “through wide exposure to [a] robust 
exchange of ideas.”127  
Fourth, the Hosty decision ignores the significant distinction between 
extracurricular and curricular activities. The Hazelwood decision rested in 
 
 
 119. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 40. 
 121. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE DISTRIBUTION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 14 YEARS OLD AND 
OVER, BY SEX: OCTOBER 1947 TO 2005 (TABLE A-6) (2005), http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
socdemo/school.html. According to the United States Census Bureau, 98.967% of students enrolled in 
colleges in 2005 were at least eighteen years old. Id.; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 
(1972).  
 122. For example, children below certain ages are not permitted to vote, drive, marry, or serve in 
the military. Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 598 (2005). 
Similarly, the areas of criminal, contract, tort, and family law all have special rules regarding minors. 
Id. at 598–99; see also Martha McCarthy, The Continuing Saga of Internet Censorship: The Child 
Online Protection Act, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 97–98 (2005) (discussing various contexts in 
which the law specifically protects minors). 
 123. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). It has also said that minors’ constitutional 
rights “cannot be equated with those of adults.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 124. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. 
 125. See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Evans, J., 
dissenting). 
 126. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002)). 
 127. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
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part on this distinction.128 Prior lower court decisions upholding 
restrictions on speech at the university level have confined their holdings 
to curricular speech.129 Allowing greater control of curricular speech by 
universities makes sense in light of schools’ need to impart specific 
information to students taking classes. Outside of a classroom, however, 
the school’s interests should not weigh as heavily.130  
The Hosty court claims that not all extracurricular activities are 
necessarily free from government regulation, citing cases, outside the 
school context, in which the government was allowed to place conditions 
on speech funded by its grant money.131 Certainly not all government 
property outside of a curriculum is a public forum. However, that fact does 
not settle the question whether, in the university context, the curricular 
nature of the speech should be considered as a major factor in the analysis. 
Fifth, a deferential test will have a chilling effect on college journalism. 
Hazelwood has had a dramatic and chilling impact on high school 
journalism.132 After Hazelwood, “[a]lmost without exception, courts 
upheld school officials’ decisions to censor.”133 If Hosty is followed, a 
similar effect is likely on college campuses.134 This would be problematic 
for several reasons. First, the absence of a free press is antithetical to the 
longstanding idea of the campus as a “marketplace of ideas.”135 Second, 
the consequences could reach beyond the confines of the college campus. 
University newspapers operate as training grounds for the professional 
journalists of the future. If student journalists are trained to avoid 
controversial or offensive subjects, they might lack the skills and 
 
 
 128. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text. 
 130. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340 
(2000). Ryan argues that schools have two functions, an academic one and a social one. Id. He argues 
that the Supreme Court tends to allow regulation of student rights when the academic function of the 
school is at issue, but not allow regulation when the social function of the school is at issue. Id.  
 131. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 60. 
 133. Peltz, supra note 14, at 497. 
 134. SPLC amicus brief, supra note 60, at *13–*17. Past college articles facing censorship 
attempts that might be upheld if Hosty v. Carter is followed include the following: “[a]n opinion piece 
opposing an upcoming referendum that would have provided the college with revenue collected from 
property taxes”; “[a]n article detailing the incoming university president’s expenditure of state funds, 
including more than $100,000 spent to remodel the president’s home and pay for his inauguration”; 
and “[a]n editorial cartoon, featuring cartoon figures as university officials, commenting on a U.S. 
Department of Education report that found the school had misused public funds when it paid for a trip 
to Disney World by students and school officials.” Id. at *16–*17.  
 135. See, e.g., SPLC amicus brief, supra note 60, at *7–*9; Peltz, supra note 14, at 535. 
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motivation to pursue such subjects when they enter the professional 
world.136  
Sixth, applying Hazelwood to the college context is problematic 
because it may permit viewpoint discrimination.137 According to ordinary 
public forum analysis, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even in a 
nonpublic forum.138 The Hazelwood Court, however, did not mention any 
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination when it articulated its legitimate 
pedagogical concerns test, leading some courts to conclude that it is 
permissible.139  
IV. PROPOSAL 
When the Hazelwood framework is used to assess university regulation 
of student speech, the critical step in the inquiry is the one that determines 
the status of the forum. Once a forum is designated nonpublic, the 
government has broad latitude to regulate. That was true even prior to the 
development of Hazelwood’s legitimate pedagogical concerns test; even 
under the general public forum analysis described in Perry, restrictions in 
a nonpublic forum need only be “reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”140  
Consequently, the best way to protect student speech rights is by either 
(a) abandoning public forum analysis in favor of some other framework, 
or (b) modifying the public forum analysis such that the majority of 
student speech that should be protected is categorized as a limited (or 
traditional) public forum. 
 
 
 136. See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 14, at 535 (“Imagine a generation of college-trained journalists 
with no practical experience handling controversial subject matter, nor with any more than an 
academic understanding of the role of the Fourth Estate in American society.”). Peltz also questions 
whether a college editor who “decline[s] to pursue a story on a university president’s use of public 
funds to remodel his home because the story would reflect negatively on the university’s public 
image” would be likely to “aggressively pursue a story about a state governor spending public money 
on personal expenses.” Id.  
 137. Id. at 508 (noting that “courts since Hazelwood have disregarded the viewpoint-
discrimination prong of nonpublic forum analysis,” at least in the case of student publications). 
 138. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 139. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 140. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1982); see also supra 
note 37 and accompanying text.  
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A.  Standards Based on Alternatives to Public Forum Analysis 
Several commentators have proposed replacing public forum analysis 
with pre-Hazelwood college free speech jurisprudence, arguing that the 
“material and substantial disruption” test developed in Tinker should 
provide the basis for evaluating regulations of student speech at 
universities.141 This test has several advantages: It allows universities to 
regulate speech when it would materially disrupt essential activities such 
as classroom learning. It is consistent with the early cases of Healy and 
Papish, which provided broad free speech rights for students.142 It also 
provides a fairly clear standard that allows students and administrators to 
understand their rights, particularly when compared to the complicated 
public forum analysis.143 However, it is extremely unlikely that the 
Supreme Court, having used the public forum analysis in the university 
context,144 would abandon it altogether in favor of the Tinker analysis.  
Other courts and commentators have proposed an intermediate scrutiny 
test.145 Under intermediate scrutiny, “the university would have the burden 
of demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate student speech 
was substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.”146 This 
would provide less protection for student speech than a standard under 
which all student speech is analyzed as a limited or traditional public 
forum, but more protection than the Hazelwood analysis.147 One major 
disadvantage of this option is that it provides no clear criteria for students 
or administrators and is likely to produce inconsistent results.148 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are College Students’ Free 
Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 199–201 (2003). 
 142. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
  143. See supra note 40.  
 144. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Martin, supra note 141, at 201–02; Laura K. Schulz, Note, A 
“Disacknowledgment” of Post-Secondary Student Free Speech—Brown v. Li and the Applicability of 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary Setting, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1185, 1237–38 (2003). 
 146. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Martin, supra note 141, at 202; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have no established criterion for ‘intermediate scrutiny’ either, but 
essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”). 
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B.  Standards Based On Modified Public Forum Analysis 
1. College Student Activities as Limited Public Forums 
One possible solution is simply to declare that in the case of college 
students, all student newspapers or other expressive activities are limited 
public forums as a matter of law.149 This would have the advantage of 
limiting schools’ authority to censor. It would also seem to be consistent 
with early speech cases, which assumed that newspapers, at least, should 
be free from censorship.150 However, as others have pointed out, courts 
will likely be reluctant to make a blanket statement of that kind.151 For one 
thing, it fails to take into account the fact that colleges may have a 
legitimate interest in speech regulations in classroom activities. Courts 
may be reluctant to say that a student’s chemistry exam, for example, is a 
limited public forum where the teacher can impose only minimal limits on 
speech. 
2.  Modified Public Forum Analysis Based on Extracurricular/ 
Curricular Distinction 
A more realistic solution is to provide courts with a more predictable 
way of applying public forum analysis. I suggest that, instead of applying 
a complicated four-factor analysis involving written policy, practice, 
context, and compatibility with expression,152 courts should base their 
public forum analysis primarily on the extracurricular/curricular 
distinction. Under a test based on the extracurricular/curricular distinction, 
an extracurricular student activity at a university would be presumed to 
occur in a limited public forum. The university would then be able to put 
into place regulations based on the time, place, or manner of expression.153 
However, the university could rebut this presumption and show that the 
forum was inconsistent with the free expression of ideas.154 For curricular 
activities, on the other hand, the presumption would be that the speech 
 
 
 149. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Schulz, 
supra note 145, at 1237. 
 150. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 151. Schulz, supra note 145, at 1237. 
 152. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.  
 153. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 154. For example, in Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees of University of 
Massachusetts, 868 F.2d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1989), the court found that the Legal Services Office of the 
university was not a forum of any kind. Id. In such a case, a court might find that the extracurricular 
activity was a nonpublic forum.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/22
p 1263 Golby book pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] UNIVERSITY STUDENT SPEECH 1285 
 
 
 
 
occurs in a nonpublic forum. In such cases, the university could establish 
restrictions on speech as long as they are related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns and are not designed to suppress the speaker’s viewpoint.155 
However, students could overcome this presumption by showing that the 
school expressed a clear intent to create a public forum, either by policy or 
by practice. 
This test has several advantages. First, it allows the continued existence 
of free and independent student media on college campuses, since the 
overwhelming majority of college newspapers operate as part of 
extracurricular activities.156 Second, it allows educators to control what 
goes on in classrooms, both out of concern for professors’ academic 
freedom157 and universities’ goal of imparting specific knowledge to 
students.158 Third, it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
suggesting that public forum analysis is the proper framework for 
scrutinizing student speech at universities.159 Fourth, it is consistent with 
cases decided prior to Hosty that generally upheld restrictions on student 
speech that occurred as part of the curriculum and found impermissible 
restrictions occurring in extracurricular settings.160 Even the Hazelwood 
Court limited its holding to curricular activities, albeit with a broad 
definition of curricular.161 Fifth, the proposed test provides clear 
guidelines for students and administrators concerning what can and cannot 
be regulated.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Since Hazelwood and the introduction of public forum analysis, student 
speech rights at all levels have been under fire. In Hosty v. Carter, the 
Seventh Circuit extended Hazelwood’s analysis further than ever before by 
holding that an extracurricular university student newspaper might be a 
nonpublic forum and thus subject to extensive censorship. In so deciding, 
 
 
 155. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 156. Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against 
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1962 (2002) (citing a study 
finding that only one of 101 daily college newspapers is considered part of the curriculum). 
 157. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]cademic freedom 
includes the authority of the university to manage an academic community and evaluate teaching and 
scholarship free from interference by other units of government.”). 
 158. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290–91 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Ryan, supra 
note 130, at 1340–41 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in school cases can be explained by 
the principle that “schools are free to limit speech that would disrupt the learning process”). 
 159. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra Part II.C. 
 161. See supra note 52.  
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it brought into question several decades of commitment to the importance 
of free and independent student media on college campuses. 
Hosty v. Carter’s holding, that a dean who censored a newspaper could 
not reasonably have known that her actions were unconstitutional, 
illustrates the fundamental problem with how public forum analysis has 
been used to evaluate student speech. As currently applied, public forum 
analysis involves a complicated weighing of factors that students and 
administrators cannot be expected to understand. In the absence of a clear 
standard, administrators can act with impunity. Courts should develop a 
new framework that provides clear standards and also protects the long 
tradition of the university as a “marketplace of ideas.” 
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